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Methods of International Human Rights
Adjudication: Towards a More
Structured Decision-Making Process for
the European Court of Human Rights
By STEFAN SOTTIAUX* & GERHARD VAN DER SCHYFF**
I. Introduction
Many legal questions are variations of the conflict between
competing societal needs for certainty and flexibility. The
constitutional lawyer's version of this dilemma is the long-standing
controversy over whether constitutional courts should utilize
categorical or balancing methods in fundamental rights adjudication.
The principal arguments of the debate are by now: categorical or rule-
like decision-making fosters consistency, stability, and predictability;
a balancing process or standard-like decision-making, by contrast,
ensures adaptability to changing social conditions and the particular
circumstances of each case. While the virtues and drawbacks of
certainty and flexibility constitute the most familiar line of
argumentation in this debate, other, often related justifications have
been advanced by those advocating adherence to either rules or
standards in constitutional adjudication.' Although the literature is
vast, the battleground for the struggle between the different camps in
the balancing versus categorization debate has generally been limited
to domestic constitutional review. This article broadens the debate to
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1. See infra Part II.B.1.
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international human rights adjudication to propose that the
arguments on both sides cannot be considered in the abstract, but
depend on various factors, one of which is the nature of the court that
is charged with adjudicating the matter at issue.
To shift the focus from domestic to international human rights
does not remove the tension between the different values and
interests at play. On the contrary, some of the arguments on both the
pro-balancing and pro-categorization sides gain particular importance
when the decision-making authority is located in a multinational
court. On the one hand, the use of a reliable and predictable method
of adjudication is indispensable when the court is in a position to give
guidance to a great number of domestic decision-makers and
prospective applicants to the Convention on Human Rights.
However, on the other hand, the creation of an inflexible doctrine at
the international level is problematic given the subsidiary role a
multinational court plays in the enforcement of applicable rights in
states with different constitutional identities. This role entails, among
other things, that such a court is usually not a final court of appeal or
fourth instance, and that it is not to substitute its views for that of
domestic courts which bear the primary responsibility for the
enforcement of regional or international guarantees (or similarly
worded domestic constitutional provisions). The guiding idea of this
article is that international courts should, in their decision making
process, seek to find a middle ground between these opposing
concerns. In other words, an international tribunal's style of opinion
writing should reflect the inherent tension between its constitutional
guidance function on the one hand, and the principle of subsidiarity
on the other.
The solution put forward here is that courts, responsible for
supervising human rights compliance in different nations should
engage in what might be called structured balancing. This is an
adjudicatory style that avoids the inflexible, rule-like approach that is
prominent in several constitutional courts, most notably the United
2. See generally Herbert Petzold, The Convention and the Principle of
Subsidiarity, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 41
(Ronald St. John MacDonald, Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1993);
STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS,
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 216 (2006) (European Convention on Human Rights
context); ELIES STEYGER, EUROPE AND ITS MEMBERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH (1995); and HEINER TIMMERMANN, SUBSIDIARITAT UND FODERALISMUS
IN DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION (1998) (European Union context).
[Vol. 31:1
Methods of International Human Rights Adjudication
States Supreme Court, but also shies away form unprincipled ad-hoc
proportionality review, which is prominent is many venues of
international human rights adjudication. The former approach may
be suitable for domestic constitutional adjudication, but it is, as we
will argue, a style of reasoning inappropriate in a supranational
context. Similarly, the latter approach may have its advantages in
some contexts, but it is unsuited for supranational judicial decision-
making.
In order to develop the concept of structured balancing, this
article will draw on the jurisprudence and practice of the European
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the "European Court" or
"Strasbourg Court"). Part I of this article begins with a description of
the differences between balancing and categorization and an
overview of the arguments commonly invoked in their defense.
These issues are considered in light of the distinctive features of
international human rights adjudication. Part II provides an outline of
the structured balancing approach. With this theoretical background
in place, Part III then shifts focus toward the approach taken by the
European Court under the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter the "European Convention").3 Part IV illustrates the
concept of structured balancing by means of three case studies; the
first addressing the treatment of the Islamic headscarf, the second the
issue of physician- assisted suicide and, the third the Convention's
approach to restrictions of antidemocratic political parties. One the
whole, the purpose of this article is an attempt to reveal some of the
virtues and vices of the different approaches, and to offer arguments
to direct the Strasbourg Court towards a more structured-decision
making process.
II. Balancing and Categorization
A. The Balancing- Categorization Continuum
In constitutional law, balancing and categorization are usually
seen as two conflicting methods for reconciling individual rights with
competing government interests. The theoretical distinction
originated in the United States,' but soon appeared in doctrinal
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, E.U., Nov. 4,1950 [hereinafter Convention], ETS No. 005.
4. The balancing/categorization dispute in American constitutional law can be
traced back to the balancing/absolutism debate in early First Amendment doctrine.
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writing in other constitutional democracies The difference between
both approaches lies in the measure of discretion each of them
accords to decision-makers interpreting and applying constitutional
provisions. To clarify the nature of categorization and balancing it is
instructive to look to legal theory's traditional opposition between
"rules" and "standards."6  Rules and standards translate certain
background principles and policies - e.g., autonomy, democracy,
efficiency - into legal directives. Where they differ, however, is in
the degree of discretion they each confer upon the decision-maker.
American constitutional scholar Kathleen M. Sullivan gives the
following account of the rules versus standards dichotomy: "Rule-
like" legal directives, she writes, "[bind] a decision-maker to respond
in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts."8
See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 398 (1985).
Proponents of the absolutist view usually accepted that the 'absolute' nature of the
First Amendment does not imply that it is unlimited in scope. In the process of
delineating the scope of the right to freedom of speech at the definitional stage, rule-
like exceptions to the First Amendment's scope are identified. Critics of the
absolutist view defended an approach that would focus less on defining the categories
of protected and unprotected speech, and more on balancing free speech and
countervailing interests. See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1434 (1962) (defending the absolutist view); Wallace Mendelson,
On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV.
821 (1962) (defending a balancing view).
5. For the United States, see, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law
in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); David L. Faigman, Reconciling
Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian Principles versus Supreme
Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Justices]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Categorization
and Balancing]. For Canada, see, e.g., Pierre Blanche, The Criteria of Justification
Under Oakes: Too Much Severity Generated Through Formalism, 20 MAN. L.J. 437
(1991); Paul Horwitz, Law's Expression: The Promise and Perils of Judicial Opinion
Writing in Canadian Constitutional Law, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 101 (2000); Andrew
Lokan, The Rise and Fall of Doctrine under Section I of the Charter, 24 OTTAWA L.R.
163 (1992).
6. On the distinction between rules and standards, see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976);
Schlag, supra note 5; Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 57-63.
7. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 57.
8. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 58. See also Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1687-
1689 (1976) (discussing Von Ihering's concept of "formal realisability"); Schlag, supra
note 5, at 381-383; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1998)
[hereinafter Schauer, Playing by the Rules] (describing rules as entrenched
instantiations of background justifications).
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"Standard-like" legal directives, by contrast, "[tend] to collapse
decision-making back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation." 9 In other words, rules give the
decision-maker less discretion than do standards because rules limit
the number of factors he or she may take into account (the
"triggering facts"), whereas standards allow the decision-maker to
consider all the relevant factors, including the background principles
and policies that motivate the standard.' °  Sullivan goes on to
demonstrate that the distinction between balancing and
categorization is just another way to conceptualize the rules versus
standards dispute." The balancing method is standard-like, in that it
allows the decision-maker a realm of discretion to weigh the different
rights and interests implicated by the case against the background
principles at stake. 2 The categorical approach, by contrast, limits
future decisional discretion: once the boundaries of a category have
been established, there is no more room for the further consideration
of the different facts and interests involved. Hence, the categorical
style is rule-like. 3
The categorical versus balancing divide is not an absolute
dichotomy. It is rather a continuum representing the varying degrees
of discretion, which a particular method of adjudication provides to
future or subordinate decision-makers.'" At the far end of the
categorization pole are rigid, bright-line rules, limiting the decision-
makers' work to the determination of which category the factual
situation at bar falls under the prescribed rule.'" At the far end of the
balancing pole are wholly open-ended standards, allowing decision-
makers to weigh competing rights and interests on a case-by-case
basis. In between those two extremes, numerous forms of
9. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 59.
10. Id. at 58-59. See also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 536
(1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] ("By limiting access to the reasons behind
the rule, rules truncate the array of considerations available to a decsionmaker.").
11. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 59.
12. Id. at 60. See also Richard H. Fallon, Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REv. 56, 80 (1997) (defining 'balancing' as "a metaphor
for (rather than a literal description of) decision processes that call for consideration
of the relative significance of a diverse array of potentially relevant factors."). For a
discussion of different forms of balancing, see Aleinikoff, supra note 6 at 945-948.
13. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 59.
14. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 823, 828-32 (1991).
15. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 59.
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adjudication exist that leave more or less room for balancing. Some
methods will be more rule-like; others more standard-like. 6 In other
words, the choice is not so much between whether to exclusively use
categorization of balancing methods, but rather how much balancing
or categorization to use in a particular context.
B. Justifications
i. Conventional Justifications
Before considering why either categorical or balancing methods
would be most appropriate in international human rights
adjudication, this section briefly reviews some of the advantages and
disadvantages, typically attributed to rules and standards, in order to
lay the groundwork for the discussion to follow. The longstanding
jurisprudential disagreement produced a host of stereotyped
arguments for and against rules or standards in legal analysis in
general, 7 and fundamental rights adjudication in particular.'8  The
virtues most commonly associated with rule-based decision-making
are certainty, predictability, and consistency.' 9 The attraction of the
categorical approach lies in its ability to restrain decisional discretion,
thus allowing those affected by a legal directive to foresee the
consequences of their behavior. Other recurring arguments for rule-
based decision-making include fairness and the restraint of arbitrary
official action,2' efficiency,2' and democracy.22 The use of categorical
16. Several attempts have been made at ranking the different "tests," "formulas,"
"prongs" and "standards" in American constitutional law on the
balancing/categorization continuum. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 6, at 1534.
17. Schlag, supra note, 5 at 383 (arguing that the rules/standards debate "has
given rise to patterned sets of 'canned' pro and con arguments about the value of
adopting either rules or standards in particular contexts.").
18. References are generally limited to the literature concerning constitutional
adjudication. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 11, at 79-82; Robert F. Nagel, The
Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Schauer, Formalism, supra
note 11, at 538-545; Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 135-166; Schlag,
supra note 5, at 383-390; Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 62-69; StBASTIEN VAN
DROOGHENBROECK, LA PROPORTIONNALITt DANS LE DROIT DE LA CONVENTION
EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME. PRENDRE L'IDEE SIMPLE AU StRIEUX, 335-423
and 853-1045 (2001).
19. E.g., Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 137-145.
20. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1688 ("Official arbitrariness means the sub
rosa use of criteria of decision that are inappropriate in view of the underlying
purpose of the rule.").
21. E.g., Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 145-149. Efficiency is
[Vol. 31:1
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methods in constitutional adjudication may foster these values in
several ways. 3  Critics of categorization, however, question the
desirability of rule-based decision-making. Their main objection
against rules is that the latter do not permit decision-makers to take
into account all the relevant differences and similarities between
particular cases.24  While a rule-based process constrains decision-
makers from arbitrary behavior, it also dictates certain outcomes
regardless of specific facts, which may in turn result in arbitrary
decisions. In other words, predictability and consistency are achieved
at the cost of fairness and substantive justice.25 More flexible
balancing approaches allow decision-makers to adapt to the changing
circumstances, therefore not forcing "the future into the categories of
the past. ' '26 In addition to the advantages associated with flexibility,
balancing has been praised for its deliberation- and democracy-
enhancing potential. By compelling a decision-maker to openly
explain and justify her choices, balancing would further accountability
and extended dialogue about constitutional values.27
ii. Justifications and International Human Rights Adjudication
Having outlined the categorization and the balancing framework,
the question now posed is which may be most appropriate for an
linked to certainty, because certainty allows private persons to order their affairs
productively. See, e.g., Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 62-63.
22. A common objection against balancing approaches is that they transfer the
responsibility for weighing competing public interests from the political branches to
the judicial branch. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 984-986; Sullivan, Justices,
supra note 6, at 64-65. See also Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 158-
162.
23. For a discussion of the justifications for categorical decision-making in
constitutional adjudications, see Scalia, supra note 19.
24. As a result, rule-based decision-making necessarily entails a number of wrong
decisions. The reason therefore is that rules, as generalizations, are over- and/or
under-inclusive from the perspective of their background justifications. See, e.g.,
Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 31-34.
25. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 66 ("Standards are.., less arbitrary than
rules. They spare individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules .... ). A
similar concern was voiced by Supreme Court Justice Stevens in several First
Amendment cases. According to Stevens, the categorical approach to the First
Amendment "sacrifices subtlety for clarity" and "does not take seriously the
importance of context" (see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 426 (1992)).
26. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 11, at 542.
27. See e.g., Horwitz, supra note 6, at 105; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986);
Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 67-69.
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international tribunal with jurisdiction over an international treaty?
Commentators have endlessly debated the distinctive features of a
system of international human rights protection as opposed to a
domestic one. Yet, the focus of this debate has generally been on
matters of substance, the most controversial issue, perhaps, being the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, a concept that is featured in
the case law of the Strasbourg organs among other supranational
bodies. 8 Matters of form have generally been overlooked in these
debates. This article proposes that form and substance cannot be
separated, and that assumptions about the proper role of an
international human rights court should inform not only the
substantive result of a case (for instance the width of the margin of
appreciation), but also the form, for instance the choice between
categorization and balancing, through which that result is reached.
Although many of the conventional arguments in the rules/standard
controversy can easily be transposed to the realm of international
judicial decision-making, others merit particular attention in this
context. They can be grouped in three interrelated categories:
certainty; efficiency; and jurisdiction.
a. Certainty
Of all the values that have been associated with a rule-like mode
of decision-making, none is easier to envision than certainty. A clear
and predicable legal directive allows the addressees to comply with it
and to adjust their activities in advance. This is a key element of the
rule of law. Several commentators of the European Convention have
drawn attention to the significance of legal certainty for the effective
enjoyment of its guarantees.29 A number of virtues have been
attributed to certainty in this context: a predictable rule may result in
an increased likelihood of compliance with fundamental rights
standards by the Contracting States and in the removal of inhibiting
28. See infra Part III.B for the European Convention; Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R.,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984, Proposed Amendments to the
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, 36, 58-59; Hertzberg v.
Finland, Doc. A/37/40, 161 at 165: SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL (SECOND TO SIXTEENTH SESSIONS) 124 at 126, 10.3 for the United
Nations Human Rights Committee.
29. See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, Les cadres du jugement juridique, 2 ANNALES
DE DROIT DE LOUVAIN 177, 194 (1998); Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial
Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin,
11 HUM.. RTS. L.J. 57, 77 (1990); Drooghenbroeck, supra note 19, at 933-1000.
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effects on protected behavior by the beneficiaries of those rights.0 In
other words, the bearers of rights will be more inclined to exercise
their rights if they were reasonably certain of the real extent of the
protection afforded them.
An issue closely related to certainty is the guidance function of a
court. The connection between the categorization/balancing
controversy and the guidance function of a court has received ample
attention in domestic constitutional jurisprudence.31 Judges and
scholars argue that the highest courts within a domestic court system
should, given their supervisory role, adopt a mode of reasoning that
gives sufficient direction to the lower courts. This pertains to what
can be described as the constitutional function of the highest courts,
as such courts have to see to the integrity and ultimately the certainty
provided under a particular legal system, by ensuring that lower
courts are clear as to the constitutional parameters within which they
are called to dispense justice. This constitutional function forms part
of a legal system's internal culture, namely the interaction between
different spheres and actors within a legal system, and in this respect
between various courts. Perhaps, the fostering of an adequate
internal culture is even more pressing in respect of international
courts, given the many different jurisdictions they oversee, the
heterogeneity of the population of the Member States, and the
diversity of the lower court systems requiring constitutional guidance.
Much then obviously centers on the structure of decision-making
employed by international courts in steering domestic courts and
tribunals as to their constitutional responsibilities.
Legal systems, however, are not only characterized by an internal
culture, but also by external relationships. Courts must, in this
regard, provide the litigant parties before them with certainty as to
their claims and positions on the law. Courts' external relationships
are comprised of both a constitutional and a remedial function. The
former implies that courts must provide sufficient guidance and
certainty to political actors in terms of their legal responsibilities,
30. In this respect, see Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1688-89 (arguing that a rule
"increases the likelihood that private activity will follow a desired pattern" and that
"it removes the inhibiting effect on action that occurs when one's gains are subject to
sporadic legal catastrophe.").
31. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 1179 ("To adopt such an approach [balancing],
is effectively to conclude that uniformity is not a particular important objective with
respect to the legal question at issue."); Horwitz, supra note 6, at 108; Bertha Wilson,
Decision-Making in the Supreme Court, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 227, 233-35 (1986) (both
discussing decision-making in the Canadian Supreme Court).
2008]
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thereby minimizing the instance of legal proceedings. In turn,
supranational courts need to provide certainty not only to lower
courts, but also to a wide variety of domestic political decision-
makers and law enforcement agencies that are subject to the same
treaty obligations. Obviously, courts also have a remedial function in
solving disputes, thereby giving satisfaction to those seeking justice.
However, as opposed to national courts, the remedial function of
international tribunals, although important, is not their prime
function. For example, the Convention organs are simply not
equipped to provide individual justice to all of its 800 million
prospective litigants in the same measure as national courts are with
respect to such matters as caseloads and fact-finding." However, the
Strasbourg Court is called upon to foster relationships, both internally
and externally, enabling it to discharge its constitutional function to
provide adequate legal certainty to national courts and political actors
as to their responsibilities under the Convention. This again stresses
the need for an effective and clear decision-making mode in setting
the pace for others actors to follow. This does not mean, however,
that the remedial function is to be neglected. Subsidiarity will only be
strengthened as national authorities are able to make proper
decisions based on clearer international guidelines. In other words, a
rule-like opinion not only provides guidance to national governments
and their citizens, but also to the lower domestic courts, which have
the primary responsibility for enforcing treaty obligations.
b. Efficiency
A related benefit of the categorical mode of judicial decision-
making is efficiency. Rules produce decision-making economies by
allocating the limited decisional resources of individual decision-
makers, freeing them from the responsibility of scrutinizing every
relevant aspect of a situation.33 As Sullivan writes, rules minimize
"the elaborate, time-consuming, and repetitive application of
background principles to facts". 34 The time-saving potential of
categorization may be of particular significance with regard to the
32. Luzius Wildhaber, the former President of the Strasbourg Court, defended a
similar view on 14 May 2002 in his address to the Conference of European
Constitutional Courts XIIth Congress entitled The Place of the European Court of
Human Rights in the European Constitutional Landscape. See also Greer, supra note
3, at 165-74.
33. Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 145-49.
34. Sullivan, Justices, supra note 6, at 63.
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work of an international tribunal that has - unlike certain national
courts of last resort35 - no discretion to reject applications, and may
accordingly be faced with an enormous caseload.36 The elaboration of
a more formalized doctrine would permit such courts to more easily
dismiss cases at an early stage (e.g., the admissibility stage), than
when it must go through all the stages of an ad hoc balancing
standard. The time and resources saved may be used for a more
careful analysis of novel claims thereby bolstering the bench's desired
constitutional function.
For example, the Strasbourg Court has in recent years been
confronted with an increasing number of cases. The expansion of the
Council of Europe has led to more potential litigants from a greater
number of different jurisdictions. Add to this an increasing rights
consciousness and the system may threaten to become backlogged.37
The Court has the largest territorial jurisdiction of all permanent
international courts in the world and sees more applications lodged
with it as every year passes. The response to this challenge to date
has been to question the structure of the Strasbourg organs. Whereas
the erstwhile Commission was called upon to filter applications and
select only those important enough to be referred to the Court, the
system no longer knows a distinction between a Commission and
Court. Instead, Protocol 11, which took effect on November 1, 1998,
created a permanent court, the members of which sit in committees of
three, Chambers of seven and a Grand Chamber of 17 judges.38
35. See, e.g., SuP. CT. R. 10, ("Review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but a judicial discretion. A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons.").
36. See also J.H. Gerards, Belangenafweging bij rechterlijke toetsing aan
fundamentele rechten 16 (Kluwer, 2006) (Balancing and Judicial Review of
Fundamental Rights); Drooghenbroeck, supra note 19, at 994; Colin Warbrick,
Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: the Adjudicative Background to
the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1073, 1096 (1990).
37. Whereas 82 provisional applications were lodged in 1955, 16,353 such
applications were lodged by 1998 before the system's reform. At the end of 2006,
89,887 applications were pending before the Court. In that year the Court managed
to hand down 1,560 judgments, while more than 40,000 applications were declared
inadmissible, struck off or dealt with administratively. Although 2006 saw a forty-
percent increase in the number of judgments handed down in comparison to 2005,
serious concerns still persist about clearing the caseload. Cf. the Court's Survey of
Activities 2006 (Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, 2007); Greer,
supra note 3, at 36-41.
38. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery, May 11, 1994, ETS No.
155. See Stefan Trechsel, Towards the Merger of the Supervisory Organs: Seeking a
2008]
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Committees have to filter applications by striking patently
inadmissible cases from the list, while most cases are heard by
Chambers, which may relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber
upon request of the parties or where the possibility arises to deviate
from earlier case-law.39 The Grand Chamber also acts as a sort of
appellate court, by re-examining serious cases decided by a
Chamber. '° These reforms, designed to streamline the Court, soon
proved to be inadequate. As a matter of fact, Protocol 14, signed on
May 13, 2004, and yet to be ratified by all Member States, would
allow judges sitting by themselves to strike inadmissible cases from
the list in order to manage the thousands of applications." The
prospect of European Union accession to the Convention also
heightened concerns that the Court may fail to live up to its
reputation in the future. 2 The Explanatory Report to the Protocol
reiterates the system's subsidiary character, laying the primary
responsibility for securing the Convention's rights and freedoms on
the signatory states.43  Although these practical and structural
proposals for reform are undoubtedly important attempts at
strengthening the Court's efficiency, a change in the style of decision-
making may likewise serve to temper the weight of the burdensome
caseload. A change in decision-making holds a number of advantages
that will also complement practical reforms.
For example, it may be easier for the Court to reshape its
adjudicative style than to embark on the long and technical road of
periodically amending the Convention's control system.
Way out of the Deadlock, 8 HuM. RTs. L.J. 11 (1987); Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens
Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism, as
Established by Protocol 11, Signed on 11 May 1994, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81 (1994);
Hans Christian KrUger, Selecting Judges for the New European Court of Human
Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. L.J. 401 (1996); Henry G. Schermers, Election of Judges to the
European Court of Human Rights, 23 EUR. L. REV. 568 (1998); Alastair R. Mowbray,
The Composition and Operation of the New European Court of Human Rights,
Summer PUB. L. 219 (1999); Marie-Bdn6dicte Dembour, 'Finishing off Cases: the
Radical Solution to the Problem of the Expanding ECtHR Caseload, 46 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 604 (2002).
39. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 27 and 30.
40. Convention, supra note 4, art. 43.
41. Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Amending the
Control System of the Convention, May 13, 2007, ETS No. 194. See Alistair
Mowbray, Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Recent
Strasbourg Cases, 4 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 331 (2004); Greer, supra note 3, at 42-47.
42. Explanatory Report: Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human
Rights, Amending the Control System of the Convention, CETS no. 194, 13.
43. Id. at T 12.
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Furthermore, by focusing more on the filtering of applications, as is
also the case with the highest courts in the United States and
Germany, the Court implicitly affirms its constitutional nature. As
explained above, this means that the Court is there to direct domestic
courts and other decision-makers, instead of attempting to see to
individual justice as if it were a district court. Not only will the
Court's attention be turned to its practical workings in this respect
(e.g. filtering procedures), but also, importantly, to its intellectual
labors in the reasoned shaping of judicial doctrine.
c. Jurisdiction
Whereas the first two arguments seem to point in the direction of
a more categorical approach in supranational human rights
adjudication, the next argument reveals the complexity of this issue.
As noted in the previous section, participants in the rules versus
standards debate often invoke democracy-related arguments. An
explanation can be found in that the choice between rules and
standards has important consequences for the division of authority
between competing decision-makers. Frederick Schauer explains the
rules versus standards dichotomy with reference to the concept of
jurisdiction: "[T]he essence of rule-based decision-making lies in the
concept of jurisdiction, for rules, which narrow the range of factors to
be considered by particular decision-makers, establish and constrain
the jurisdiction of those decision-makers." 4  In other words, role-
allocation between legislative and judicial decision-makers may
explain a preference for rules over standards or vice versa.4 ' The
ability of rules to constrain a decision-maker's authority has
frequently been invoked in the context of domestic constitutional
review as a means of ensuring judicial restraint.46 Emphasis on the
primacy of the legislature and the democratic legitimacy it provides
may see the judiciary limited to crafting neat rules in order to leave
the balancing of competing interests, as much as possible, to those
44. Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 9, at 231-232.
45. Id. at 158-162 ("Rules ... operate as tools for the allocation of power. A
decision-maker not constrained by rules has the power, the authority, the jurisdiction
to take everything into account. Conversely, the rule-constrained decision-maker
loses at least some of that jurisdiction.").
46. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 984-986; Scalia, supra note 19, at 1179-
1180 ("In the real world of appellate judging, it displays more judicial restraint to
adopt such a course than to announce that, 'on balance,' we think the law was
violated here - leaving ourselves free to say in the next case that, 'on balance,' it was
not.").
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elected for that very function. It is conceivable that such a rule-based
process of adjudication may be even more desirable in a system of
international human rights enforcement so as to constrain
international judges, lest they become supranational legislatures,
making policy judgments on a case-by-case basis. However, the
problem is that through the formulation of rules an international
court not only constraints itself, but, at the same time, severely limits
the power of domestic judges to interpret Convention guarantees or
similarly worded domestic human rights protections. For instance, if
an international bench were to decide that the expropriation of land
was not, as a rule, protected under a treaty right to property, lower
domestic courts would find it hard to deviate from such a bright-line
directive. Domestic legislatures would then be given a jurisdictional
free hand in legislating in this field, bar very clear national
constitutional guarantees to the contrary. The scope of an
international instrument could become limited and artificial, so as to
leave those subject to it under-protected. In other words, a
particularly strong emphasis on the decisional jurisdiction of non-
judicial actors expressed by rules would produce judicial, though not
necessarily political, conservatism.47
A related concern is that the adoption of formal doctrine at the
supranational level may be difficult to reconcile with the distinct
constitutional identities of the contracting states to an international
human rights treaty. Constitutionalism only makes sense in relation
to some predominant identity. 48 National, cultural or legal identity
informs constitution making and adjudication, which in turn
generates distinct constitutional identities. Robin West defines
constitutional identity as "that aspect of our collective and individual
self-conception which we owe to our shared constitutional heritage,
and which at least on occasion determines outcomes in close
constitutional cases in ways that overarching principles of political
morality do not."49 A nation's constitutional identity often transpires
in its approach to important fundamental rights issues. For example,
47. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 11, at 542.
48. Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity
and DIVERSITY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY,
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
49. Robin West, Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect: A
Comment on George Fletcher's Constitutional Identity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 245 (Michel
Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
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nations may reasonably disagree as to whether the denial of crimes of
genocide, such as the denial of the Holocaust, deserves protection
under the right to freedom of expression. Even in those countries
where a "crime" of genocide denial would pass constitutional muster,
opinions may differ as to the conditions that need to be satisfied to
bring such a prohibition in line with free speech guarantees - e.g.,
publicity, specific intent to incite hatred. Similarly, reasonable
disagreement is possible as to what extent a ban on the wearing of a
headscarf may be permissible under the right to freedom of religion.
Disparate treatments of these issues under national legal systems
reflect the different constitutional values and policies of the
community in which they are embedded. A rule-based solution of
these matters at the international level - for instance, a decision that
categorically denies free speech protection to the denial of certain
historical facts or a bright-line rule that would allow a ban of certain
types of headscarf in all public facilities - would then hinder the
preservation and further development of distinct constitutional
identities. Given the principle of subsidiarity and the importance of
respect for national and regional identity, it would follow that a
supranational court owes some deference to these national
constitutional identities. With respect to the substantive outcome of a
dispute, such deference may be accomplished, through the application
of the margin of appreciation. In addition, however, deference to
domestic constitutional culture should also inform a supranational
court's decision-making technique. One way to achieve this goal is by
avoiding the use of rule-like methods of adjudication, that leave
insufficient room for the development of domestic constitutional
doctrine."°
d. Conclusion
It will be clear by now that a transposition of the different
arguments in the categorization/balancing debate to the realm of
international human rights adjudication cannot support a position
wholly favoring one approach over the other. On the contrary, a
supranational court's style of decision-making should reflect the
inherent tension between its constitutional guidance function and the
need for efficiency on the one hand, and the principle of subsidiarity
and respect for domestic constitutional identities on the other hand.
50. For a different view, see Drooghenbroeck, supra note 19, at 982-990 (arguing
that clear judicial directives promote subsidiarity rather than undermining it).
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Stated differently, in choosing a more standard- or rule-like mode of
adjudication, international courts should strive not to claim too much
jurisdiction, but also should not abdicate too much jurisdiction either.
Too much jurisdiction would diminish certainty value, while too little
jurisdiction would overly restrict the interpretive freedom of
international and national courts, which could in turn diminish the
real protection of rights guaranteed at the treaty level.
1II. Structured Balancing
A. Democratic Necessity: A Yardstick of Proportionality under the
European Convention
Proportionality review is an important tool of judicial decision-
making employed by constitutional courts all around the world. 1
Influential elaborations of the principle of proportionality can,
amongst others, be found in the case law of the German
Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme Court.52 Although
there are significant local variations in its formulation, proportionality
analysis usually consists of the following three well-known sub-tests:
(1) suitability (the limiting measure must be capable of achieving the
(legitimate) aim pursued); (2) necessity (the limiting measure must be
the least restrictive means to achieve the relevant purpose); and (3)
proportionality in the narrow or strict sense (there must be a
reasonable balance between the limiting measure and the aim
pursued).53 The three components of proportionality have received
ample scholarly attention. One of the factors that has been
highlighted by commentators from different national backgrounds is
51. It is so pervasive today that one author has characterized it as a "universal
criterion of constitutionality." DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 162
(2004).
52. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.); Beit Sourik Viii. Council v. Gov't
of Israel, [20041 43 ILM 1099 (Isr.); BVerfGE 67, 157, 163 (German Constitutional
Court); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) B.C.L.R. 665, 104 (Const. Ct., S. Afr.)
53. See, e.g., ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66-69
(2002); Kay Hailbronner & Marcel Kau, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO
GERMAN LAW 53, 76 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005), for similar
expositions. See generally on the topic of proportionality D.W. Greig, Reciprocity,
Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 295 (1994); NICHOLAS
EMILIoU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996); Beatty, supra note 52; Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803 (2004);
Drooghenbroeck, supra note 19.
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that it is not always easy to locate proportionality review on the
spectrum between balancing and categorization. Depending, inter
alia, on the question of whether the different prongs of the
proportionality test will be subject to a high or low level of judicial
scrutiny, proportionality review has been characterized as either a
more standard-like or a more rule-like decision making process.
Most commentators agree, for instance, that the Canadian Supreme
Court's Oakes test, was originally formulated as a strict rule,5" but has
since its enunciation, come to be applied in a more open-ended
balancing fashion.5  Similarly, the various multi-tiered tests in
American constitutional law, which bear clear resemblance to
straightforward proportionality analysis in younger constitutional
democracies, have been described in terms of either categorization or
balancing, depending on the level of scrutiny they embody. 6
As will become clear in the analysis of a number of
representative cases in Part IV, the European Convention's
proportionality test was never formulated, nor intended, to operate as
a strict rule. Quite to the contrary, the central justificatory standard
applied under the European Convention exhibits all the
characteristics of a flexible, open-ended balancing test. To explain
the nature of the Strasbourg Court's proportionality analysis, it is
necessary to take a brief look at the first case that explored the
meaning of the phrase "necessary in a democratic society"; the
Strasbourg Court's decision in Handyside v. United Kingdom.7
For those who are less familiar with the Convention, the
standard of necessity in a democratic society figures in the limitation
clauses of several Convention articles, and has also penetrated the
Court's work in other areas of the Convention.' In Handyside, the
54. See, e.g., Blanche, supra note 6, at 437 (observing that, "on its face, the
[Oakes] test calls for a kind of balancing at the third step of the measure of
proportionality. But such a balancing does not usually take place since it is very
difficult not to end the operation during the two first steps of the analysis which
require proof of necessity").
55. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill. v. Colorado and Free
Speech Balancing in the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 199
(2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:
Opening up the Conversations on "proportionality, " Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 583, 607-08 (1999); Lokan, supra note 6.
56. See, e.g., Categorization and Balancing, supra note 6, at 295-301.
57. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 49 (1976)
[hereinafter Handyside].
58. The words "necessary in a democratic society" figure in the common
limitation clauses of Articles 8 to 11. See, e.g., The European Convention on Human
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Court considered the compatibility of the seizure and subsequent
forfeiture of a book on obscenity grounds with the principle of
freedom of expression of Article 10. Reflecting on the meaning of
the words "necessary in a democratic society," the Court first
observed that, "the adjective "necessary" . . . is not synonymous with
"indispensable" ... ,neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as
"admissible," "ordinary," "useful," "reasonable" or "desirable."'5 9
Necessity, implies the existence of a "pressing social need," and
requires that a restriction imposed on a Convention right be
"proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."'6
The settled formulation of the democratic necessity test runs as
follows: "[T]he notion of necessity implies that an interference [with a
Convention guarantee] corresponds to a pressing social need and, in
particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."'"
This standard, which is the Court's fixed point of departure for
reviewing governmental action interfering with Convention rights,
does not refer to the set of proportionality principles mentioned
above. What, then, does the Court mean when it talks about
proportionality? 62 A close look at the case law reveals that the notion
is used to refer to different inquiries. In many cases, the term is
employed merely to assert that a "fair balance" must be struck
between the rights of the individual and the public interest.6
Rights, art. 8, § 2 (right to privacy): "There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others." For an application of the same proportionality standard in a
different context, see, e.g., Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
57 (1985) (limitation of the right of access to a court under Article 6 (fair trial))
59. Handyside, supra note 58, at 48.
60. Id. at 48-49.
61. E.g., Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 67 (1988).
62. For an analysis of the principle of proportionality in the Convention context,
see, e.g., YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (Intersentia 2002); Marc-Andr6 Eissen, The
Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights,
in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (R. St. J.
MacDonald, F. Matscher & H. Petzold eds., 1993); Jeremy McBride, Proportionality
and the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 23 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999); GERHARD
VAN DER SCHYFF, LIMITATION OF RIGHTS. A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 214-217 (2005); Drooghenbroeck, supra
note 19.
63. See, e.g., James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) T 50 (1986). For
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Proportionality in this sense is simply a different characterization of
the very act of balancing competing interests, but with an emphasis on
evaluating the acceptability of all the proportions of a particular
interference .6
What the Court is doing here resembles what is commonly
known as proportionality in the narrow sense. Sometimes, the
concept of proportionality is applied in a more specific sense, namely
as a tool to asses the adequacy of the particular means employed to
further the interest in question - for instance the nature or severity of
a penalty.65 Occasionally, the Court has also engaged in a least-
restrictive-means analysis under the label of proportionality review.'
Without going in further detail at this point, it is important to observe
that the necessity standard functions as a highly flexible formula,
allowing the Court to weigh competing claims of individual rights and
collective goals on a case-by-case basis. In its most rudimentary form,
the democratic necessity standard gives no indication as to which of
the traditional proportionality principles are to be applied to
particular fact situations, as to what their sequence must be, or the
strictness with which they are to be applied. In other words, not only
is the democratic necessity test a balancing test, it is a wholly
unstructured one.67 If one were to locate the Court's proportionality
analysis on the rules versus standard continuum, its place would be at
the far end of the standard side.
another example, see Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 47 (1993)
("The Court's task is to determine whether the measures taken at national level were
justified in principle and proportionate. In order to rule on this latter point, the Court
must weigh the requirements of the protection of the rights and liberties of others
against the conduct of which the applicant stood accused.").
64. Van der Schyff, supra note 63, at 215.
65. See, e.g., Surek v. Turkey (No.1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 64 (observing that
the "nature and severity of the penalty imposed are factors to be taken into account
when assessing the proportionality of the interference.").
66. See, e.g., Campbell v. United Kingdom, 233 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 48
(1992); Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. % 80.
67. For a critical account of the highly flexible nature of the democratic necessity
test, see, e.g., STEVEN GREER, THE EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLES 8 TO 11 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (1997); Steven Greer,
Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights,
23 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 405, 426-427 (2003); Aileen McHarg, Reconciling
Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal
Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 62 MOD.
L. REV. 671, 673 (1999).
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B. The Margin of Appreciation
The flexible nature of the democratic necessity test is
compounded by the application of the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation. The notion of the "margin" first made its appearance in
Commission reports regarding the derogation of rights under Article
15. For example, it was found that in reacting to an emergency in
Cyprus, the United Kingdom "should be able to exercise a certain
measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation." ' The idea of there being a measure or
margin of discretion to be afforded States in complying with
Convention guarantees eventually found its way to the Court and has
since become a standard feature of its jurisprudence. 69 Importantly in
the Handyside judgment, the margin of appreciation was attributed
not only to legislatures, but also to domestic courts." In other words,
national authorities have the power of discretion, both legislatively
and judicially, in fashioning their application of the Convention.
However, the Court is always quick to add that it enjoys a
"supervisory function" in this respect, which it will exercise by
reference to the principles characterizing a "democratic society". 7
The question of jurisdiction clearly underpins the margin of
appreciation. Although the Strasbourg Court emphasizes its own
jurisdiction as guardian of the Convention, it also seeks to delimit its
jurisdiction vis-A-vis national authorities so as not to replace them.
The Court is careful not to be perceived as an international
legislature or court of appeal, thereby jeopardizing its legitimacy and
opening itself to accusations of over-reaching.
68. Greece v. United Kingdom, 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 175.
69. See De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) $ 93
(1971) (speaking of a "power of appreciation"); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), T 45 (1975) (speaking of a "power of appreciation"); Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 207 (1978) (the first express reference
to a "margin of appreciation" by the Court) for early applications of the doctrine.
70. Handyside, supra note 58, at 48 ("This margin is given both to the domestic
legislator... and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to
interpret and apply the laws in force").
71. Handyside, supra note 58, at 26 ("The Court's supervisory functions oblige
it to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterizing a 'democratic society"');
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 40 ("[I]t is in the first place for
the national authorities to assess whether there is a 'pressing social need' for the
restriction and, in making their assessment, they enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation. In the present context, however, the national margin of appreciation is
circumscribed by the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a
free press.").
[Vol. 31:1
20081 Methods of International Human Rights Adjudication
Notably, the "democratic society," to which judgments refer as
the benchmark in fixing margins, is a rather fluid concept. The
Strasbourg organs have never given a systematic definition of what a
democratic society amounts to, apart from statements regarding a
number of its cardinal principles. For instance, it is generally
accepted that such a society is characterized by pluralism, tolerance
and broadmindedness.72  These values are the bedrock of the
envisaged "democratic society" against which interferences must be
justified, but in themselves give little direction to the Court or
domestic authorities.
Hence, the margin of appreciation preeminently serves as a tool
of flexibility. 3 Its scope varies from case to case depending on a
variety of issues, such as the nature of the rights concerned, 74 the
existence or nonexistence of a "common ground" amongst the
Member States of the Council of Europe,75 and the nature and
76seriousness of the interest furthered by the limiting measure.
Although these factors provide some guidance as to the bases for the
margin of appreciation, it remains difficult to foretell whether in any
given case the margin will be wide or narrow.' There clearly is a
72. Handyside, supra note 58, at 49.
73. See Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 240, 313 (1996): "[B]ecause flexibility is
an essential element of the margin of appreciation, absolute predictability is out of
the question. The concrete circumstances and context of each case will always remain
very important in determining the margin of appreciation."
74. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) T 52 (1982)
(noting that where an "intimate aspects of private life" is concerned the margin of
appreciation left to the Contracting States is narrow).
75. See, e.g., Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 37 (1986)
(noting that where there is little common ground between the Contracting States the
latter enjoy a wide margin of appreciation).
76. See, e.g., Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 59 (1987)
(recognizing a wide margin of appreciation where the protection of national security
is concerned).
77. See, e.g., Berend Hovius, The Limitation Clauses of the European Convention
on Human Rights: a Guide for the Application of Section 1 of the Charter?, 17
OTroWA L. REV. 213, 256 (1985) ("The amount of discretion left to domestic
authorities is determined largely on an ad hoc basis and is, one suspects, governed to
some extent by what can loosely be termed political considerations."); Lord Lester of
Herne Hill, The European Convention in the New Architecture of Europe, Spring
PUB. L. 5, 6 (1996) ("The concept of the 'margin of appreciation' has become as
slippery and elusive as an eel."); Thomas A. O'Donnel, The Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Convention of Human
Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474, 479 (1982) ("The U.S. Supreme Court has develop a
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need for greater predictability in applying the doctrine of the margin
of appreciation. Although it is certainly important for the Court to
respect States' jurisdiction and national constitutional identities, this
cannot be done at the expense of values such as certainty and
efficiency. The Court's adjudicative method would arguably benefit
from greater structure in this respect, something which is explored in
greater detail below.
C. Towards a More Structured Approach
In Part II, it was argued that a supranational court's method of
adjudication should adequately accommodate its constitutional
guidance function and the need for efficiency on the one hand, and
the principles of flexibility, subsidiarity and respect for domestic
constitutional identities on the other. Clearly, in its rudimentary form
the democratic necessity test does not do justice to this conception of
supranational human rights adjudication. Moreover, the standard's
inability to foster certainty is often exacerbated by the application of
the margin of appreciation, which, in itself, is an empty vessel. This is
not to say that both concepts should be abandoned. Yet, in order to
attain an appropriate level of certainty and efficiency in the Court's
jurisprudence, a structured application of both the democratic
necessity test and the margin of appreciation is necessary. While it
needs to avoid an overly rule-based approach, the European Court
should engage in a structured form of balancing. In doing so, the
democratic necessity test can only be the starting-point.
Structured balancing can best be described as a style of
adjudication that, on the one hand, provides a meaningful degree of
certainty and guidance to the national decision-makers and
prospective applicants but, on the other hand, leaves sufficient leeway
to the domestic constitutional courts to formulate a doctrinal
approach to human rights disputes. Structuring the balancing process
under the Convention can of course take a variety of forms. What is
important is that an attempt is made to concretize the democratic
necessity test. This process, or the translation of the completely
open-ended democratic necessity test into a more or less fixed set of
parameters to be applied in all comparable subsequent cases, can be
fairly clear set of standards governing the extent of the deference to be granted, but
the European Court has not."); Drooghenbroeck, supra note 19, at 761-764
(criticizing the discrepancies between the principals the Court announces with regard
to the width of the margin of appreciation and the actual level of scrutiny).
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referred to as a form of definitional balancing.78
Structured balancing is not a novel idea. Structured balancing
tests or formulas form part of judicial practice in constitutional
democracies all over the world. In the previous section, mention was
already made of the traditional three-part proportionality analysis
employed by a number of constitutional courts.79 Other examples
include the various multi-factor balancing tests developed in
American constitutional law.' What marks the difference between
these approaches and the democratic necessity standard is that they
give clear and advance guidance to the test's parameters: Which
factors will be taken into account? What weight will be attached to
the different rights and interests at stake? Who must prove what
before the bench? What level of scrutiny will be applied? While such
tests avoid completely ad hoc decision-making, they leave
considerable leeway to domestic decision-makers. This is important
for two reasons; first, it allows the national courts to consider the facts
and the specific local circumstances surrounding the case and second,
structured balancing formulas are sufficiently open ended to allow for
the development of constitutional doctrines reflecting the
constitutional identities of a particular Contracting State.
Rather than giving a further theoretical account of the possible
types of structured balancing, the article now turns to three case
studies, the first addressing the treatment of the Islamic headscarf, the
second the issue of physician-assisted suicide and thirdly, the
dissolution of political parties.
78. On definitional balancing, see, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968).
79. See supra note 53.
80. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). ("A government
regulation [of symbolic conduct] is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[Ildentification of the specific dictates of
[procedural] due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.").
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IV. Case Studies of Structured and Unstructured Balancing
under the European Convention
A. The Case of the Islamic Headscarf
Throughout the history of Europe religion has been, and
continues to be, a source of contention. European States have
divergent relationships to religion, ranging from to militant
opposition against to its embrace. The fact that religion still
generates a host of powerful reactions accentuates the need for the
Court to give constitutional guidance in this field, allowing States to
construct and maintain their own particular constitutional identities
without exceeding fundamental norms as laid down in the
Convention. One example of the need for such guidance pertains to
regulations of the wearing of the Islamic headscarf." In essence the
question amounts to whether States can regulate or prohibit the
wearing of a headscarf, when the wearer considers it her religious
duty to cover her hair in this way.
This is exactly the question with which the Court's Fourth
Section2 and ultimately its Grand Chamber83 were confronted by in
the matter of Leyla $ahin v. Turkey. The applicant, a university
student, lodged a complaint against Turkey arguing that the ban on
the Islamic headscarf in higher-education institutions in that country
constituted an unjustified interference with her right to manifest her
religion, as guaranteed in Article 9 of the Convention. 4 The Fourth
81. See generally Decision of 24 September 2003 BVerfGE 108, 282 (where the
German Federal Constitutional Court decided that each sub-state had to decide for
itself whether it should ban teachers from wearing headscarves); Begum v.
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (where the
British House of Lords allowed a school to enforce its dress code that disallowed a
pupil from wearing clothing based on her religious conviction); T. Jeremy Gunn,
Religious Freedom and Laicit&: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004
BYU L. REV 419(2004); Axel von Campenhausen The German Headscarf Debate,
2004 BYU L. REV 665 (2004); Emmanuelle Bribosia and Isabelle Rorive, Le voile d
l'gcole: une Europe divisge, 59 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 951
(2004); Oliver Gerstenberg, Germany: Freedom of Conscience in Public Schools, 3
INT'L J. CONST. L. 94 (2005); Ann Blair and Will Apps, What not to Wear and Other
Stories: Addressing Religious Diversity in Schools, 17 EDUC. AND THE L. 1 (2005).
82. Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (Fourth
Section) [hereinafter Sahin, Fourth Section].
83. Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber) [hereinafter
Sahin, Grand Chamber].
84. Convention, supra note 4, at Art. 9. "(1)Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
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Section, and subsequently also the Grand Chamber, found that the
State interfered with the applicant's right, thereby requiring
justification under Article 9(2)."5 This entailed the questions of
whether the interference was "prescribed by law," whether it pursued
a "legitimate aim" and whether it was "necessary in a democratic
society."
In testing the State's justification, both benches found that the
interference enjoyed a basis in Turkish law, satisfying the first
inquiry.86  It was also accepted by both that the ban pursued
legitimate aims, namely that of maintaining public order in
universities and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.87
This left only the democratic necessity test. The Grand Chamber
again confirmed the finding of the Section that the Islamic headscarf
ban was justified in principle and proportionate to the aims pursued
and, could consequently be considered as necessary in a democratic
society.m In other words, by imposing a ban the Turkish authorities
did not violate the applicant's right to freedom of religion. However,
a dissenting opinion, written by Justice Tulkens, disagreed with the
Chamber's decision. In analyzing the various judgments it
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. (2)
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
85. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83 at 71; Sahin, Grand Chamber, supra
note 84, at 78. Contra Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993) (where the erstwhile Commission found that a
secular university did not interfere with the right to freedom of religion of the
applicant where it withheld her degree certificate because of her refusal to remove
her headscarf for an official photograph).
86. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at 81; Sahin, Grand Chamber, supra
note 84, at 98.
87. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at 84; Sahin, Grand Chamber, supra
note 84, at 99.
88. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at 114-115; Sahin, Grand Chamber,
supra note 84, at 122-123. Rozakis and Vaji JJ. concurred in a separate opinion
(finding that the majority only needed to consider the application on the grounds of
the right to freedom of religion in article 9, and not also the right to freedom of
education in article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention). The decision of the Grand
Chamber was subsequently referred to in the admissibility decision of KOse v. Turkey
of 24 January 2006, in which the Court held that school uniform regulations, which
meant that a headscarf could not be worn, would not have constituted a violation of
the right to freedom of religion in article 9 had it amounted to an interference in the
first place.
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immediately becomes clear how unstructured the majority of the
Grand Chamber, and the Fourth Section before it, was in balancing
the various competing interests. In contrast, the dissenting opinion of
Justice Tulkens shows a much greater concern for structure in the
balancing process.
i. Fourth Section and Grand Chamber
Although both the Fourth Section (hereinafter "Section") and
the majority in the Grand Chamber (hereinafter "Majority") found
the ban to be justified, their statement of the general principles to be
applied in testing the justification for the interference contained
noteworthy differences. As to the similarities in the two decisions,
both were in agreement that in delimiting the State's margin of
appreciation, particular attention had to be paid to the existence of a
common European approach to the significance of religion in society
and its role in relation to the State. It was found that such a
consensus was lacking among the States, especially when it pertained
to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational
institutions. This meant that particular attention had to be paid to the
role of national decision-making bodies in deciding such matters.89
This element increased the State's margin of appreciation because no
common European standard could be identified with which to
measure the desirability of such a ban. Both benches were therefore
in agreement that a deferential standard of review had to be applied.
Where the decisions differed was in the Section which, unlike
that Majority, stated that the scope of the State's margin of
appreciation had to be determined by considering the importance of a
Convention right, the nature of the restricted activities and the aim of
89. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at $$ 101-102; Sahin, Grand Chamber,
supra note 84, at $ 109. See also Otto Preminger v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A), 50 (1994) ("As in the case of 'morals' it is not possible to discern throughout
Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society (...) even within
a single country such conceptions may vary. (...) A certain margin of appreciation is
therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of
the necessity of such interference."). See also Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 1996-
V Eur. Ct. H.R. 58 ("What is likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a
particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from
place to place, especially in an era characterized by an ever growing array of faiths
and denominations."); Aernout Nieuwenhuis, European Court of Human Rights:
State and Religion, Schools and Scarves. An Analysis of the Margin of Appreciation as
Used in the Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 1 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 495 (2005)
(highlighting the different approaches to state and religion in Europe).
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the restrictions.' The Majority mentioned the importance of the right
to freedom of religion in its opening statement, but it did not explain
whether this had to be factored into the decision.91 Contrary to its
own principles, the Section did not consider the importance of the
right to freedom of religion, limiting its investigation to the aim of the
restriction and the State's desire to protect secularism and promote
equality between the sexes by insisting on the ban.92 Secondly,
applying its guiding principles to the facts, the Section held that the
reasons adduced by the State in justifying the ban had to be "relevant
and sufficient". 9  Although this has become an important and
somewhat established phrase in the Court's vocabulary on the
limitation of rights, the Majority did not rely on this standard, nor did
it explain the reason for this omission.94
Both judgments did find convincing the government's argument
that upholding the principle of secularism can be considered
"necessary for the protection of the democratic system in Turkey." 95
Yet, it remains unclear from both judgments whether the standard
applied is limited to the facts of this case or may also be applied to
future disputes before the Court. This is important because, although
threats against secularism in Turkey might easily justify a headscarf
ban under the standard, the same may not be true for other States.
For example, should the headscarf ban in French state schools
also be justified as "necessary for the protection of the democratic
system" even though France has a different political situation than
Turkey? Could the fact that the standard was expressed during the
application of the general principles to the facts at hand, and not as
part of the statement of such principles, be a clue as to its ad hoc
nature? The Court did not say.
This is all rather remarkable, as one would have thought that a
simple statement of general principles - standards which are
undoubtedly also intended to guide national authorities - would have
90. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at % 101.
91. Sahin, Grand Chamber, supra note 84, at 104 (arguing that religious
freedom was one of the foundations of a democratic society and one of the most vital
elements that make up the identity of believers and their conception of life).
92. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at 1 104-113.
93. Id. at 103.
94. See, e.g., Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.
77 (holding that interferences with the right to freedom of religion had to be
"relevant and sufficient").
95. Sahin, Fourth Section, supra note 83, at 106; Sahin, Grand Chamber, supra
note 84, at 114 (majority opinion); 5 (dissenting opinion).
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shown greater consistency between two judgments essentially in
agreement with one another. One would expect greater consistency
between the two judgments, considering that they rely on the same
general principles. The internal inconsistencies of the decisions are
also worth noting as they illustrate how the general principles are
distilled only to be applied in a haphazard fashion. It is fair to say
that both judgments essentially followed an ad hoc approach to
balancing. Principles and factors were seemingly created and referred
to where necessary. This emphasizes the Court's dynamic approach
over its adherence to certainty and efficiency. Although bright line
categorical rules cannot be expected in such a complex field, one
would have expected a greater attempt at structuring the guidelines as
to how balancing is to be conducted.
ii. Dissenting Opinion
The above mentioned structural concerns also preoccupied
Justice Tulkens. Although she accepted that a lack of consensus may
lead to a wide margin of appreciation, and by implication a lenient
standard of review, she lamented what she perceived to be a total lack
of supervision.' At the outset of her opinion, she developed a
general justificatory test resembling the traditional formulation of the
principle of proportionality: first, whether the interference was
appropriate; second, whether the interference was the least restrictive
measure possible; and lastly whether it was proportionate. 9 Tulkens
wrote that the Court's review had to be conducted in concreto,
meaning the actual position of the applicant had to be considered in
how the interference affected her in particular. 98 This becomes quite
clear from the fact that she not only considered secularism and
equality as reasons for limiting the right, but also liberty, and more
particularly the liberty of the applicant, as a reason not to limit the
right-this is something which the Section and Majority did not do.'
Instead, the benches conducted a rather detached and abstract review
by focusing on the general situation as such, without relating their
decisions to the applicant's plight in any meaningful way.
96. Sahin, Grand Chamber, supra note 84, at 3 (dissenting opinion) ("European
supervision cannot... be escaped simply by invoking the margin of appreciation.").
On the facts though she found that there did indeed exist consensus between States,
thereby requiring a more stringent level of review.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. ("The Court's review must be conducted in concret.....
99. Id. at $ 4.
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Focus on the facts as they apply to a particular applicant entail a
heavier burden for the State to satisfy than if it simply had to advance
general arguments, the truth of which is not open to any real dispute.
Justice Tulkens also observed that the Majority made no distinction
between teachers and students when it came to wearing the Islamic
headscarf, whereas she felt that such a difference had to be factored
into the court's decision.'O° Tulkens relied on the decision in Dahlab
v. Switzerland, where the Court took note of a teacher's role-model
position toward her students and the possible proselytizing effect her
wearing of the headscarf might have on them. °t This is a distinction
that the Section and Chamber failed to factor into their decisions,
although both judgments referred to the Dahlab decision. 0 2
iii. Structured Balancing Test
The overall question then to be answered is: how should, or
rather how could, the Court have proceeded in ensuring better
structured judgments that not only respected States' jurisdiction, but
also ensured certainty and efficiency? A number of approaches could
conceivably have been followed. For example, the Court could have
focused its efforts on formulating a balancing approach that not only
dealt with headscarves, but with interferences restricting the wearing
of religious apparel and symbols as such. This would have given more
guidance to national authorities in such matters, thereby enhancing
certainty and efficiency, and stressing the Court's constitutional
function by not simply opting for a decidedly ad hoc solution.
Essentially, the various judgments contain sufficient material for a
more structured balancing test to have been laid down.
Such a test could, for instance, have taken as its basis the private-
public divide, referred to in Article 9.3 This would have given ample
100. Id. at $ 7 ("While the principle of secularism requires education to be
provided without manifestation of religion and while it has to be compulsory for
teachers and all public servants, as they have voluntarily taken up posts in a neutral
environment, the position of pupils and students seems to me to be different.").
101. Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1(concerning a teacher of
small children at a state school being prohibited from wearing the headscarf after her
conversion to Islam).
102. Dissenting Opinion of the Grand Chamber, supra note 84, at 7 ("While the
principle of secularism requires education to be provided without manifestation of
religion and while it has to be compulsory for teachers and all public servants, as they
have voluntarily taken up posts in a neutral environment, the position of pupils and
students seems to me to be different.").
103. In characterising the private/public divide it can for instance be argued that
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room to hold that European consensus dictates that the wearing of
religious apparel and symbols in private had to enjoy a sufficiently
higher and uniform measure of protection, while the lack of
consensus about wearing such items in public, justified a wider margin
of appreciation for States. The Court could then have decided
explicitly on particular levels of review. For example, a limitation on
the wearing of religious dress in private needs to be "compellingly"
proved, while similar restrictions in public can be justified by a lower
level of review. Drawing on the distinction in Dahlab v. Switzerland,
it can be argued that restrictions on religious dress in public must
meet a lower level of justification where they concern public officials
and other persons exercising symbolic functions. A higher level of
review could be required for private persons engaging in everyday
professional, educational, commercial and social interaction.'
4
Restrictions affecting the first category could then be justified if
"adequately" proved by the State, while the second category could be
afforded a higher level of protection with "sufficient" proof being
required. The tests, so developed, could be refined by determining
whether a judge has to test a matter in concreto or in abstracto - this
was not always sufficiently expressed by the judgments. In
complementing the various levels of review it can be argued that
restrictions that require "compelling" and "sufficient" proof must be
tested in concreto, while restrictions requiring "adequate" proof may
be tested in abstracto. This would help to concretize what is actually
meant by the different levels of review. In other words, the higher
the level of review, the closer the inspection of the facts, and the facts
the greater the State's interest in, or the need for it to regulate, a particular subject
matter the greater its public nature. E.g., a wholly privately funded educational
institution based on a particular religious or philosophical conviction would clearly
belong to the private sphere in comparison to a wholly state-funded educational
institution based on the principle of secularism. The private sphere could also extend
to institutions that enjoy state-funding, either in full or partially, where the purpose is
to guarantee such an institution's autonomy. In this regard mention can be made of
state funding for religious organizations in Belgium, which is aimed at allowing such
organizations to exercise their autonomy, instead of them becoming part and parcel
of the public domain. See Rik Torfs, Church and State in France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands: Unexpected Similarities and Hidden Differences, BYu L. REV. 946, 955-
960 (1996). It also speaks for itself that one's home would belong to the private
sphere.
104. I.e. different categories of people justify different levels of review. See, e.g.,
Vogt v. Germany, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 60 (noting the special role that teachers
fulfill in respect of their pupils); Ahmed v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.,
63-65 (finding that restrictions on the political activities of local government
officers were justified in the interest of impartiality owed by such officers).
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particular to the case at hand, must be; while the lowest level of
review will be satisfied with a broad and general inspection of the
facts.
Refinement could also be introduced, by not only mentioning
various values to be weighed by a court or some other national
authority, but also by attaching particular weight to such values in
aiding balancing. The various judgments above bring a few such
values to the fore and also give a number of clues as to their weight.
For example, some values to be distilled are clearly the liberty of the
subject and the protection of secularism. In translating these values
to the proposed levels of review, it can be argued that secularism is
not to be a factor regarding restrictions of the private sphere, while it
may be factored for the public sphere - giving the State more leeway
in pursuing secularism the lower the justification is, while still
protecting the private sphere from unwanted State intrusion. The
opposite would also ring true, namely the more stringent the level of
justification, and the more concrete the review: the higher the regard
to be paid to the liberty of the subject, or stated differently the
importance of the right at issue. Similar factors could also obviously
be devised for other values or purposes, such as the achievement of
equality by imposing a ban on religious apparel. Moreover, "the less
restrictive means test", as mentioned by Justice Tulkens, could also
be included to indicate the severity with which a level of review is to
be applied. The more stringent the level of review, the more regard
must be paid to alternative means for the State in achieving its
purpose. This would mean that only very important purposes could
outweigh a subject's right where a higher level of justification is
required.
In practice, such a composite test of democratic necessity under
Article 9 might be formulated and structured as follows:
Having considered the need to construct and maintain a
common European constitutional identity while not
replacing individual national identities, a restriction of the
wearing of religiously inspired apparel or symbols will be
considered proportional and necessary in a democratic
society where such a restriction, the onus of proof resting on
the State:
a) of the private sphere is compellingly proved: the Court
having reviewed the facts in concreto, having placed weighty
emphasis on the liberty of the subject in relation to the
importance and extent of the purpose and where the State
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does not pursue secularism and where the State cannot
achieve its purpose by means of less restrictive reasonable
alternatives.
b) of the public sphere - where it concerns private persons
engaged in professional, educational, commercial, social or
comparable activities - is sufficiently proved: the Court
having reviewed the facts in concreto, having placed
particular emphasis on the liberty of the subject in relation to
the importance and extent of the restriction, and where the
State considered achieving its purpose by means of less
restrictive reasonable alternatives.
c) of the public sphere - where it concerns public officials or
other persons engaged in powerful symbolic functions - is
adequately proved: the Court having reviewed the facts in
abstracto, having placed emphasis on the liberty of the
subject in relation to the importance and extent of the
restriction.
The above is but an example of a structured balancing test that
can arguably be constructed from the Court's existing case-law,
especially drawing on some of the themes addressed by the various
benches in the Leyla $ahin judgments. Not only does this test
introduce levels of review, it also demarcates the scope of application
of the various levels, and gives guidance as to whether facts are to be
reviewed concretely or abstractly each time. It also determines the
relative importance of the liberty of the subject, in this case the right
to freedom of religion, as the background or measure against which a
State's interference must be judged. In judging the justifiability of a
State's restriction, the various levels also indicate the extent to which
reasonable alternatives can or must be factored. This relies on the
Court's practice of only considering reasonable alternatives in the
most serious of cases, and not in all matters before it." The added
structure also brings the margin of appreciation to life, in a tangible
way, by allowing more discretion under some circumstances than
others - something that the Court already does, but in a rather ad hoc
105. See, e.g., Vogt v. Germany, supra note 105, at 9 59 (questioning the absolute
nature of loyalty, and its far-reaching consequences, expected by Germany of its civil
servants); Ahmed v. United Kingdom, supra note 105, at T 63 (investigating whether
the State pursued its purpose with minimum impairment of the applicants' rights);
Foxley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 33274/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. 91 43 (2006) ("the
implementation of the measures must be accompanied by adequate and effective
safeguards which ensure minimum impairment of the right").
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fashion. Here it is important to note that in giving structure to
national authorities' discretion, one does not necessarily limit their
discretion, but streamlines its application for future cases. In other
words, structured balancing does not have to mean that the Court
intrudes on national jurisdictions more so than it would have done
using other methods of adjudication. As a matter of fact, the Section
and Grand Chamber would probably have achieved the same result
had it applied the proposed test, but with the added benefit of having
given real constitutional guidance. The test is also wide and broad
enough to serve as the starting point for dissenting judgments to add
to or subtract from, while leaving a national authority ample room to
increase the level of protection it wants to render its subjects under
the test.
B. The Case of (Physician) Assisted Suicide
A second example of an unstructured application of the
democratic necessity test in a highly controversial matter can be
found in the Court's approach to (physician) assisted suicide. Laws
around Europe vary greatly with regard to assisted suicide, it being
legal in some nations, while criminal in others. An important issue is
whether a prohibition of assisted suicide may amount to a violation of
one or more of the fundamental rights of (terminally ill) individuals
who would choose to avoid what they consider to be an undignified
end to their lives. In Pretty v. United Kingdom, the European Court
considered the issue from the perspective of articles 2 (right to life), 3
(prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and 8 (right to
private life).'06 It held that no right to die could be derived from
Article 2 and that no positive obligations for the State arose under
Article 3 to provide a lawful opportunity for assisted suicide.1°7
Hence, the analysis primarily focused on Article 8. According to the
Court, a ban on assisted suicide amounts to an interference with the
right to "private life", thus requiring justification under the second
paragraph of Article 8." The Court gave an expansive interpretation
of the concept of "private life," reading within its ambit the notion of
106. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Pretty]. For
a comprehensive discussion of the case, see Olivier De Schutter, L'aide au suicide
devant la cour europ~enne des droits de I'homme, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 71 (2003).
107. Pretty, supra note 107, at $$ 34-42; 43-56.
108. Id. at 1 62-67. (citing with approval Rodriguez v. the Attorney General of
Canada, [1994] 2 L.R.C. 136 (Can.)).
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"personal autonomy" and "the ability to conduct one's life in manner
of one's choosing."' 9 Both concepts, the Court reasoned, may involve
the opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or
morally harmful or dangerous nature, even activities resulting in the
death of the individual concerned."' In this respect, emphasis was
placed on notions such as "human dignity", "human freedom" and
"the quality of life."
11'
The decision to bring the 'right' to assisted suicide within the
notion of "private life" may be subject to criticism."' What is beyond
dispute, however, is that once the Court has established that certain
conduct falls within the scope of Article 8(1), interference by the
State needs to conform to the requirements of Article 8(2). In this
regard, the parties and the Court agreed that the restriction on
assisted suicide was "in accordance with the law" and pursued the
legitimate aim of safeguarding life and thereby protecting the rights
of others."' The debate therefore centered on the question whether
the British legislation - which contained a blanket ban on assisted
suicide - was "necessary in a democratic society." In light of the
rather sweeping statements on the importance of human dignity and
the quality of life under the definitional prong, it may be somewhat
surprising that the Court needed only a page and a half to conclude
that the total prohibition on assisted suicide was proportionate to the
aims pursued and consequently satisfied the democratic necessity test.
How did the Court apply the democratic necessity standard in this
case?
As is usually the case, the Court began its judgment with a
statement of the general principles governing Article 8(2)."1 To start
with, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds
to a "pressing social need" and that it is "proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued." Further, the national authorities are
allowed a margin of appreciation in determining whether interference
109. Id. at 61-62.
110. Id. at $$ 62-64 ("As recognized in domestic case-law, a person may claim to
exercise a choice to die by declining to consent to treatment which might have the
effect of prolonging his life.").
111. Id. at 65.
112. Compare Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al., 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (the right
to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment Due Process Clause).
113. Pretty, supra note 107, at 69.
114. Id. at $ 70.
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is necessary in a democratic society, but their decisions remain subject
to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the
Convention. Finally, the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the
national authorities will vary in accordance with the nature of the
issues and the importance of the interests at stake. As noted, these
generalized observations allow for great flexibility and say little as to
how the Court goes about in balancing the competing interests at
stake. It is remarkable that the Pretty judgment gives no further
guidance in this connection, except for the statement that "[t]he more
serious the harm involved the more heavily will weigh in the balance
considerations of public health and safety against the countervailing
principle of personal autonomy.''.. The adjudicative method adopted
in this phrase is that of proportionality in the narrow sense: the
weighing of the importance and/or degree of infringement of one
interest (i.e. public health and safety) against the importance of
satisfying the other (i.e., personal autonomy). But what about the
other components of traditional proportionality review? Under what
standard of review are they to be applied? Which of the parties bears
the evidentiary burden, for instance of demonstrating that an absolute
prohibition is justified? The Court did not say. Perhaps most telling
in this regard are the Court's observations regarding the margin of
appreciation. When the Court applied its general principles on the
margin of appreciation to the case at hand, it recalled two cases in
which it held that the margin is narrow "in the intimate area of an
individual's sexual life."'' 6 Rejecting the applicant's arguments for a
similarly "compelling reasons" test in this case, the Court merely
stated that it "does not find that the matter under consideration in
this case can be regarded as of the same nature, or as attracting the
same reasoning."".7  Why is this so? Are individual end-of-life
decisions less personal or fundamental than decisions about sexual
life?"' The Court gave no further indications as to the width of the
margin of appreciation in the case at hand, or, more generally, the
broader area of end-of-life decisions. No analysis was made of the
115. Id. at 74.
116. Id. at 171.
117. Id.
118. For a different view, see Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) ("The
choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality."); See also John Rawls, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Robert
Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, T.M. Scanlon, & Thomas Nagel, Assisted Suicide: The
Philosopher's Brief, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, in Volume 44.
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traditional margin of appreciation-criteria, such as the nature of the
rights and interests concerned, and the existence or nonexistence of a
"common ground" amongst the Member States of the Council of
Europe.
However, an interesting feature of the Pretty case is that while
the Court made no attempt at formulating a structured balancing test
to guide domestic decision makers in the area of end-of-life decisions,
its factual analysis exhibits an approach that could be described in
terms of structured balancing, namely 'rational basis' analysis. In
American constitutional law, rational basis review is the lowest level
of scrutiny. It asks whether governmental action at issue is
"reasonably" or "rationally" related to a "legitimate" government
interest." 9 While these terms do not figure in the Pretty judgment, the
resemblances between the Court's reasoning in Pretty and traditional
rational basis review are striking. Thus, for instance, the Court
explicitly declined to engage in some form of less restrictive means
analysis of the blanket prohibition of assisted suicide under review.
What is more, the Court did not even require the Government to
demonstrate that no conceivable alternative to a complete ban would
be able to adequately reconcile the need to protect vulnerable
patients and competing individual liberty interests. As the Court put
it: "[M]any [patients] will be vulnerable, and it is the vulnerability of
the class which provides the rationale for the law in question." 2 '
And: "It is primarily for States to assess the risk and the likely
incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on assisted suicides were
relaxed or if exceptions were to be created. Clear risks of abuse do
exist, notwithstanding arguments as to the possibility of safeguards
and protective procedures.' '2  The Court even went as far as to
suggest that there was no evidence that the applicant was vulnerable
and was accordingly in need for protection. However, declining to
consider Mrs. Pretty situation in concreto, it nevertheless found a
violation of the Convention.122 Such review is again in abstracto and
points to the highly deferential approach taken in this case. Finally,
the hypothesis that the Court engaged in some form of rational basis
review is further substantiated when one compares the reasoning and
results in the Pretty case with similar American and Canadian cases,
119. See, e.g., United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980).
120. Pretty, supra note 107, at 74.
121. Id.
122. Id. at I 73; 75.
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in which the courts made a more conscious application of the rational
basis standard . 3
The conclusion of the forgoing analysis is that it is difficult to
place the Pretty approach on the spectrum between categorization
and balancing. The Court applied the democratic necessity test and
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the most flexible way.
No attempt whatsoever was made to (explicitly) concretize these
open-ended concepts in more structured balancing avenues that
would allow for more certainty and efficiency in the growing area of
end-of-life decisions. That there may be a need for further guidance
by the Convention organs in this area was, however, implicitly
acknowledged in the Court's observation that "[i]n an era of growing
medical sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, many
people are concerned that they should not be forced to linger on in
old age or in states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which
conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal identity."'2 4 No
such guidance is provided by the Pretty decision, save with regard to
the concrete issue before the Court. Indeed, the ultimate outcome of
the case was phrased in a rather categorical fashion: namely that an
absolute ban on assisted suicide is, as a rule, whatever the specific
circumstances of the case, never in violation of Article 8.
C. The Case of the Dissolution of Political Parties
One would be wrong to conclude from the headscarf and the
assisted suicide cases that the Strasbourg organs have never sought to
engage in a more rule-based decision-making process. To begin with,
there are several instances in which the Court and the erstwhile
Commission adopted the method of category definition."2 The use of
category definition typically occurs at the definitional stage.' Thus,
for instance, the abuse of rights provision in Article 17 has been
123. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 ("The Constitution... requires that
Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government
interests."); Rodriguez v. the Attorney General of Canada, supra note 110, at 111 et
seq. (holding that in this "contentious" and "morally laden" area, it suffices that an
prohibition on assisted suicide is "rationally connected" to the government purpose,
and the government show "that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that it has
complied with the requirement of minimal impairment").
124. Pretty, supra note 107, at 65.
125. See also Warbrick, supra note 37, at 1080-1081 (identifying various areas in
which the Strasbourg organ's relied on 'bright-line' solutions).
126. See supra note 5.
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interpreted to categorically deny Article 10 (freedom of expression)
protections to revisionist speech. In the Court's opinion, there is "a
category [of] clearly established historical facts - such as the
Holocaust - whose negation or revision would be removed from the
protection of Article 10 by Article 17. ' 7 As noted, this approach is
highly problematic in the context of international human rights
adjudication, as it trades subsidiarity and respect for domestic
constitutional identities for the principles of certainty and efficiency.
There are certain areas, however, in which the Court clearly engages
in what might be called structured balancing. Most examples can be
found in the field of freedom of expression (Article 10) and
association (Article 11)."' Perhaps one of the most promising
examples is the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence with regard to the
dissolution of antidemocratic political parties.9
The modern Convention approach to party closures was
developed in a series of cases against Turkey, a process which
ultimately cumulated in the landmark judgment of Refah Partisi (the
Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey.'3° In 2001, the Third Section of
the Court held, by four votes to three, that the dissolution of the
political party Refah by the Turkish Constitutional Court did not
amount to a violation of Article 11. On request of the applicants, the
case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which in 2003 unanimously
confirmed the Third Section's judgment. Both the Third Section and
the Grand Chamber concurred in the Turkish Government's view
that the political plans of Refah were incompatible with the concept
of a secular democratic society. In the Court's opinion, the acts and
127. See, e.g., Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 665, 679-81 (2000).
128. For examples, see Stefan Sottiaux, TERRORISM AND THE LIMITATION OF
RIGHTS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2008).
129. For a discussion of these cases, see, e.g., Mustafa Koqak & Esin Oruicii,
Dissolution of Political Parties in the Name of Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the
European Court of Human Rights, 9 EUR. PUBLIC LAW 399 (2003); Stefan Sottiaux,
Anti-Democratic Associations: Content and Consequences in Article 11 Adjudication,
22 NETHERLANDS Q. OF HUM. RTS. 585 (2004).
130. See, e.g., Case of United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey,
App. No. 19392/92, Eur. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1998; Socialist Party and Others v.
Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, Eur. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1998 ; Case of Freedom and
Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, App. No. 23885/94, Eur. H.R. Dec. & Rep.
1999; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98,
41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, Eur. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 2001 (Third Section)
[hereinafter Partisi, Third Section]; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v.
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,41343/98 and 41344/98, Eur. H.R. Dec. & Rep.
2003 (Grand Chamber) [hereinafter Partisi, Grand Chamber].
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speeches of the political party's members and leaders revealed its
long-term policy of setting up a regime based on Islamic law within
the framework of a plurality of legal systems. The Court also
accepted the contention that some of Refah's leaders did not exclude
recourse of force in order to implement its policy. Having reached
the conclusion that Refah's goals were anti-democratic from a
Convention perspective, the Court went on to formulate the
standards by which freedom-restricting measures against such parties
must be judged.
The Third Section and the Grand Chamber had little difficulty to
recognize that the impugned measures were "prescribed by law" and
pursued a "legitimate aim," and immediately turned to the question
of whether the dissolution was "necessary in a democratic society."''
In this respect, both judgments contain a lengthy summing-up of the
settled principles regarding the position of political parties and the
limits within which they may conduct their activities under the
Convention system. Two observations merit particular attention in
the present context. The first observation figures in both judgments.
It is the rather rule-like observation that "a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the legal and constitutional basis
of the State on two conditions: (1) the means used to that end must in
every respect be legal and democratic; (2) the change proposed must
itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles.
13 2
Without going into the debate about the theoretical underpinnings of
such a mainly content-based test,'33 it is clear that both conditions are
framed in rather strict language, seemingly leaving "subversive'
political parties with no Article 11 protection whatsoever. According
to the Third Section, a political party's program may not violate "one
or more rules of democracy" and a party's political method must "in
every respect" be "legal and democratic". 3" However, contrasting
these observations are the more protective and standard-like
statements that immediately follow them in the Grand Chamber's
judgment. The Grand Chamber further explained that only
"convincing and compelling reasons" can justify restriction on
political parties, that Contracting States have only a "limited margin
131. Partisi, Third Section, supra note 131, at 1 37-42; Partisi, Grand Chamber,
supra note 130 at 52-67.
132. Partisi, Third Section, supra note 131, at T 47; Partisi, Grand Chamber, supra
note 130, at 98.
133. See Sottiaux, supra note 130.
134. Partisi, Third Section, supra note 131, at 47.
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of appreciation" in this respect, and that the European Court's
supervisions must be "rigorous" where political parties are
concerned.'
At first sight, it is not entirely clear how these generalized
statements relate to one another. However, much of the confusion is
eliminated when one reads the remainder of the Grand Chamber's
opinion. According to the unanimous judgment, "drastic measures" -
such as the dissolution of an association - may be taken only in the
most serious cases. 36 In this connection, the Court reflected on what
it called "the appropriate timing for dissolution", holding that "a
State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political
party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to
implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the
Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for
democracy is sufficiently established and imminent."'37  In light of
these considerations, the Grand Chamber articulated a new overall
standard for assessing whether the dissolution of a political party
satisfies the requirements of the democratic necessity test. In order to
ascertain whether dissolution meets a pressing social need, the Court
must concentrate on the following three points:
(i) whether there was plausible evidence that the risk to
democracy, supposing it had been proved to exist, was
sufficiently imminent; (ii) whether the acts and speeches of
the leaders and members of the political party concerned
were imputable to the party as a whole; and (iii) whether
the acts and speeches imputable to the political party
formed a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of
society conceived and advocated by the party which was
incompatible with the concept of a "democratic society.'
38
This is neither the place to assess the substantive merits of the
Refah formula nor its relation to other principles announced
elsewhere in the Refah judgments.'39 What is important in the present
context is to highlight the doctrinal qualities of the three-part test.
From a theoretical perspective, the test can be characterized as a
135. Partisi, Grand Chamber, supra note 131, at 100.
136. Id. at 1 100.
137. Id. at 102.
138. Id. at 104.
139. See Sottiaux, supra note 129 (discussing the relationship between the
'imminence' requirement and the 'incitement' standard endorsed elsewhere in the
Refah judgments).
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concretization of the democratic necessity standard, providing
guidance to domestic decision-makers and applicants with regard to
party closures, and arguably other "drastic measures" against political
associations." In addition, the Refah test offers an efficient
framework for the Court to assess similar cases in the future. Yet, at
the same time, the test is sufficiently flexible and open-ended to
accommodate different domestic views on the contentious issue of
how a democratic state should best deal with its enemies. In judging
the legitimacy of far-reaching restrictions on a political party, the
Court will look both at the content and the consequences of the
party's program and actions: not only need "the model of society
conceived and advocated by the party be incompatible with the
concept of a democratic society," it must also present a "sufficiently
imminent" threat to the democratic regime. Rather than requiring
that there be strict compliance with "fundamental democratic
principles," and permitting only action that is in "every respect"
"legal and democratic," the Grand Chamber employs the somewhat
vaguer terms of a "clear picture" of a political system that is
incompatible with the "concept of a democratic society." In addition,
although clearly intended to supplement the content-centered inquiry
with a requirement of immediacy, the notion of a "sufficiently
imminent" "risk to democracy" is sufficiently open-ended to justify
the conclusion that the Refah test is a standard more than a rule.'
Thus by avoiding an overly statutory-like approach, the Court leaves
room for the preservation and development of domestic
constitutional doctrine reflecting the different constitutional identities
of the Contracting States.
V. Conclusion
In recent years, the Strasbourg Court's decision-making process
has been increasingly subject to criticism for its lack of theoretical and
conceptual coherence.'42 In his comprehensive work on the principle
140. See Partisi, Grand Chamber, supra note 131, at 1 100.
141. It is interesting to contrast the notion of a "sufficiently imminent risk to
democracy" with the stricter "imminent lawless action" requirement adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The
Brandenburg test, which is used to review restrictions on violent-conductive speech,
is generally considered to be a categorical rule. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1491 (1975).
142. Warbrick, supra note 37, at 1079.
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of proportionality in the case law of the Convention, S6bastien van
Drooghenbroeck deplored the European Court's decisional
minimalism and its reluctance to develop Convention doctrine, calling
these features symptoms of the "radical mootness" of the European
judge."3 What is clear is that the highly flexible democratic necessity
test, combined with the unpredictable application of the doctrine of
the margin of appreciation, can no longer be considered a satisfactory
adjudicative approach for a Court with the largest territorial
jurisdiction of all permanent international courts. It is submitted in
this paper that the European Convention system, and international
human rights law more in general, is in need of a clearer theoretical
account of the nature of international human rights adjudication.
Such a theory will encounter many difficulties, the most important of
which is perhaps the relationship between the constitutional
protection of fundamental rights at the domestic level and
international human rights adjudication.
The purpose of this paper was to explore some of these issues.
Its central idea is that an international tribunal should adopt an
adjudicatory style that reflects the inherent tension between its
guidance function and the need for efficiency on the one hand, and
the principle of subsidiarity on the other hand. The solution
defended here is that courts, responsible for supervising human rights
compliance in different nations, should engage in what might be
called structured balancing. This is a method of decision-making that,
on the one hand, avoids overly categorical reasoning, but, on the
other hand, shies away from the purely ad-hoc balancing approach.
143. Drooghenbroeck, supra note 19, at 849.
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